Third-Party Sanctioning and Compensation Behavior: Findings From the Ultimatum Game by Chavez, Alex K & Bicchieri, Cristina
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Behavioral Ethics Lab Philosophy, Politics and Economics
12-2013
Third-Party Sanctioning and Compensation
Behavior: Findings From the Ultimatum Game
Alex K. Chavez
University of Pennsylvania, achavez@sas.upenn.edu
Cristina Bicchieri
University of Pennsylvania, cb36@sas.upenn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/belab
Part of the Behavioral Economics Commons, Personality and Social Contexts Commons, and the
Social Psychology Commons
At the time of publication, author Alex Chavez was affiliated with the University of Michigan. Currently, he is a faculty member at the Behavioral Ethics
Lab at the University of Pennsylvania.
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/belab/5
For more information, please contact libraryrepository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Chavez, A. K., & Bicchieri, C. (2013). Third-Party Sanctioning and Compensation Behavior: Findings From the Ultimatum Game.
Journal of Economic Psychology, 39 268-277. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2013.09.004
Third-Party Sanctioning and Compensation Behavior: Findings From the
Ultimatum Game
Abstract
We measured the beliefs and behavior of third parties who were given the opportunity to add to or deduct
from the payoffs of individuals who engaged in an economic bargaining game under different social contexts.
Third parties rewarded bargaining outcomes that were equal and compensated victims of unfair bargaining
outcomes rather than punishing perpetrators, but were willing to punish when compensation was not an
available option. Beliefs of whether unequal bargaining outcomes were fair differed based on the normative
context, but actual punishment, compensation, and rewarding behavior did not. This paper makes a
contribution to the literature on informal mechanisms of social norm enforcement by comparing negative
sanctions, positive sanctions, and compensation behavior by third parties.
Disciplines
Behavioral Economics | Economics | Personality and Social Contexts | Social Psychology
Comments
At the time of publication, author Alex Chavez was affiliated with the University of Michigan. Currently, he is
a faculty member at the Behavioral Ethics Lab at the University of Pennsylvania.
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/belab/5
 Third-party sanctioning and compensation behavior: Findings from the ultimatum 
game 
Alex K. Chaveza,*, Cristina Bicchierib 
 
 
 
a Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA.  
b Departments of Philosophy and Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, 
Philadelphia, PA, USA. 
* Corresponding author. Fax: 781-623-0407. 
Email-addresses: achavez@sas.upenn.edu (A. K. Chavez), cb36@sas.upenn.edu (C. 
Bicchieri). 
 
2	  
 
Abstract. We measured the beliefs and behavior of third parties who were given the 
opportunity to add to or deduct from the payoffs of individuals who engaged in an 
economic bargaining game under different social contexts. Third parties rewarded 
bargaining outcomes that were equal and compensated victims of unfair bargaining 
outcomes rather than punishing perpetrators, but were willing to punish when 
compensation was not an available option. Beliefs of whether unequal bargaining 
outcomes were fair differed based on the normative context, but actual punishment, 
compensation, and rewarding behavior did not. This paper makes a contribution to 
the literature on informal mechanisms of social norm enforcement by comparing 
negative sanctions, positive sanctions, and compensation behavior by third parties. 
 
3	  
 
1. Introduction  
Without legal enforcement, social norms rely on informal sanctions to produce 
norm-conforming behavior. Empirical studies have reported evidence of negative 
sanctions (e.g., punishment) both by parties directly involved in the norm-governed 
interaction (de Quervain, et al., 2004), and by uninvolved third parties (Kahneman, 
Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Kurzban, DeScioli, & O’Brien, 
2007). In these studies, the punished transgression refers to a violation of social 
norms of fairness or reciprocity, but usually no independent evidence is presented 
about the players’ consensus about the norm’s existence and relevance to the 
experimental situation. In the definition that we adopt, a social norm (Bicchieri 2006, 
p.11) is a behavioral rule for which it must hold for sufficiently many people that: 1. 
they know that such an approved behavioral rule exists; 2. they prefer to comply 
with the rule if they believe a) that others will also comply (empirical expectations) 
and b) that others believe they ought to comply and might sanction non-compliance 
(normative expectations). We explore the possibility that individuals may employ 
compensation and rewards – in addition to sanctions – as mechanisms for upholding 
social norms.  
 Notice this definition allows a social norm to exist while not always being 
followed. Only if sufficiently many people have the appropriate empirical and 
normative expectations about others’ behavior and beliefs will a social norm reliably 
be followed. Consensus and compliance may thus differ. While observed behavior 
remains a crucial measure of compliance with elicited norms, recent experimental 
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work has introduced the explicit use of questionnaires to assess normative consensus 
(Bicchieri & Chavez, 2010; Bicchieri, Xiao, & Muldoon, 2011; Krupka & Weber, 
2013; Rauhut &Winter, 2010; Reuben & Riedl, 2013). In this paper, we therefore 
measure both the beliefs and behavior of third parties who tradeoff sanctioning, 
compensating, and rewarding in response to the violation of or compliance with a 
social norm. 
An example of informal sanctioning is the punishment of individuals who 
divide a good unfairly, when the understanding of what constitutes fair division 
depends on context. Under an equality context, a fair division is one in which goods 
are allocated equally amongst all parties. Under an equity context, a fair division is 
one that divides goods according to each party’s share due to merit or acquired right. 
Assessing normative consensus should show different judgments of what counts as 
fair in equity versus equality conditions and this differential assessment should be 
reflected in behavior. So we would expect third-party punishment levels to differ 
under contexts that invoke rules either of equity or equality. In particular, we would 
expect uneven divisions to be punished less under equity contexts in which one party 
is perceived as being entitled to a greater share of the good.  
Although costly punishment is more commonly studied, it is not the sole 
mechanism for upholding a social norm. Costly rewarding also plays a role in 
supporting pro-social behavior. When both punishments and rewards were available 
to the players, second-party rewarding was frequent and promoted cooperation 
(Rand, Dreber, Ellingsen, Fudenberg, & Nowak, 2009; Andreoni, Harbaugh, & 
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Vesterlund, 2003). Third-party rewarding was also common when there was the 
possibility of reputation formation (Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002; Seinen 
& Shram, 2006). Few experimental studies, however, have compared third party 
punishment and rewarding in a non-repeated, reputation free game (cf. Almenberg, 
Dreber, Apicella, & Rand, 2011). Whereas positive and negative sanctions promote 
norms in that they increase their long-term expected realization, another mechanism 
for upholding social norms is compensation of the victim of a violation. 
Compensation is not directly norm promoting. It rather honors norms, as it points to 
the fact that the victim ought to have received a fair share or had a right to be treated 
fairly. If indeed compensation has such an important signaling function, we would 
expect all three regulatory mechanisms – compensation, punishment, and rewarding 
– to be employed in upholding social norms.  
Our hypothesis is thus that third parties will employ both compensation and 
positive sanctions in addition to negative sanctions when all three regulatory 
mechanisms are available. Furthermore, it is worthwhile to investigate whether the 
presence of all three mechanisms leads individuals to discount one in favor of 
another. For example, the opportunity to compensate victims might focus third 
parties on feelings of compassion, which has been found to decrease punitive 
sentiment (Condon & DeSteno, 2011). 
To test our hypothesis, we focused on a version of the Ultimatum Game 
(Guth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982) in which Proposers proposed a division of 
a sum of $10 to Responders, who accepted or rejected the offer. In the case of a 
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rejection, both parties received nothing. Previous studies found that both Proposer 
behavior and second-party punishment were sensitive to different fairness contexts. 
When the roles of Proposer and Responder were assigned randomly, Proposers 
offered an average of 45% of the sum (for a review, see Camerer, 2003, Chapter 2). 
But when the role of Proposer was earned by higher scorers on a general knowledge 
quiz, Proposers offered an average of only 35%. Moreover, overall rejection rates 
were the same whether roles were assigned randomly or based on quiz performance 
(Hoffman, McCabe, Keith, & Smith, 1994), although Proposers offered moderately 
less in the latter condition, apparently feeling entitled to a larger share under an 
equity context. Similarly, Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2003) created different offer 
contexts by allowing the Proposer to 1) choose between offering 20% and 50%, and 
2) choose between offering 20% and 0%. They found that in the first context, 
Proposers offered 20% only 31% of the time, but in the second context they always 
offered 20%. Moreover, in the first context, Responders who were offered 20% 
rejected the offer 44% of the time, whereas in the second context, Responders who 
were offered 20% rejected only 9% of the time. In the first context, the presence of a 
50/50 option prompts a norm of fairness, whereas in the second case an offer of 20% 
may just be perceived as generous (see Bicchieri, 2006, Chapter 3). Thus, second-
party punishment is clearly sensitive to context, and whether a given context elicits a 
specific norm.  
Is third-party punishment, compensation, or rewarding behavior sensitive to 
fairness context? To answer this question, we conducted a two-stage study in which 
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participants engaged in an Ultimatum Game under an equity or equality context in 
Stage 1, and in Stage 2, third parties decided to add to or deduct from the payoffs of 
participants from Stage 1 based on their bargaining outcome. To determine whether 
third parties were willing to trade off compensation and punishment, we created a 
separate experimental condition in which third parties only had the option of 
deducting from the payoffs of Stage 1 participants. This design allowed us to assess 
whether third parties preferred to compensate victims or punish perpetrators of unfair 
bargaining outcomes, and to assess whether third parties would reward fair 
bargaining outcomes. We discuss data only from Stage 2 below.  
2. Materials and Methods 
2.1. Participants 
198 college-age participants took part in Stage 2 of our study, for which 
advertisements specified that participants would earn $5.00 in addition to an amount 
that would depend on decisions made during the experiment. Of these 198 
participants, we excluded 2 due to data entry problems, leaving a total sample size of 
196. 
2.2. Procedure 
In Stage 1, participants were asked to read an article and were then given a written 
quiz on the contents of the article. They then played a single Ultimatum Game, in 
which a Proposer was randomly and anonymously paired with a Responder, and 
offered a division of $10 in increments of $1 to the Responder. That is, the Proposer 
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could choose an offer of $10 for the Proposer and $0 for the Responder, $9 for the 
Proposer and $1 for the Responder, $8 for the Proposer and $2 for the Responder, 
etc., so that the two amounts summed to $10 – hereafter, these divisions are denoted 
($10,$0), ($9,$1), ($8,$2), and so on, where the first amount is the Proposer’s payoff 
and the second amount is the Responder’s payoff. The Responder then chose to 
accept or reject the offer; in the case of an acceptance, the Proposer and Responder 
got the amounts specified by the offer, but in the case of a rejection, both parties got 
nothing. In the equity condition, the roles of Proposer and Responder were assigned 
based on quiz performance, where the instructions emphasized the entitlement of the 
Proposer: “[T]hose of you who scored in the top half on the quiz have earned the 
right to be a Proposer,” adapting the procedure of Hoffman et al. (1994). In the 
equality condition, roles were assigned randomly. Participants were told that their 
final payments might be adjusted up or down based on decisions made in other 
experiments. 
In Stage 2, participants read a detailed description of the Stage 1 task 
described above, including the instructions that Stage 1 participants received in 
either the equity condition or the equality condition. Participants in Stage 2 were 
then given an opportunity to adjust the payoffs of one pair of participants from Stage 
1 whose photocopied bargaining sheet they saw. The only bargaining outcomes we 
used were ones in which the Proposer offered ($5,$5), ($7,$3), or ($8,$2), and the 
Responder accepted. Approximately one week after Stage 1 was completed, an 
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experimenter paid the participants whose bargaining sheets were used in Stage 2, 
based on the third parties’ average adjustments. 
In the all-adjustments condition, participants were given $2.50 that they 
could use at a ratio of 1:4 to add to or deduct from the actual payoff of a Proposer 
from Stage 1, and another $2.50 that they could use at a ratio of 1:4 to add to or 
deduct from the payoff the Responder who was paired with the Proposer. For the 
uneven bargaining outcomes of ($7,$3) and ($8,$2), this condition allowed 
participants to punish Proposers and/or compensate Responders in various degrees 
and in any combination. For the even bargaining outcome of ($5,$5), it allowed 
participants to reward Proposers or exhibit the unlikely spiteful behavior of 
deducting from the payoff of either Proposers or Responders. The deduct-only 
condition was the same as the all-adjustments condition, except that participants 
could adjust the Proposer’s and Responder’s payoffs only by deducting from them, 
which forced participants to punish Proposers if they wished to enact any sanctions. 
Participants were informed that they would have to announce their decision to the 
room full of other third parties at the end of the experiment, and that their decisions 
were therefore not anonymous. Though the lack of anonymity could create 
incentives to perform in front of others (third parties and experimenters), we 
introduced it to make salient the normative expectations associated with norm 
violation and compliance. For example, if punishment of norm transgressors is 
socially expected, we would expect a sizable number of third parties to punish unfair 
Proposers or possibly reward fair ones. If compensation is another mechanism by 
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which individuals uphold social norms, we would also expect to observe 
compensating behavior. The public announcement should therefore lend particular 
salience to those mechanisms that drive norm compliance, and possibly uncover a 
collective preference for some mechanisms over others. 
Finally, at the end of the study, Stage 2 participants were given a 
questionnaire. The first question read, “Do you believe the following proposal is fair 
for both the Proposer and the Responder?” and then listed the 11 possible divisions 
of the $10.00 sum. These questions elicit players’ personal normative beliefs 
regarding fair divisions in the equity versus equality conditions described in the 
Stage 1 game. The second question measured second-order normative beliefs 
(normative expectations) in an incentivized manner:  
“The questions below refer to the first page of this survey, which all 
participants in this experiment are answering. After we collect all 
participants’ forms, we will randomly select three questions from this page, 
for which you will earn a $1.00 bonus each, if you guessed correctly. Now 
for each line below, please guess whether the majority of the participants in 
this room thought that that particular proposal was fair. Circle your answers,” 
The questionnaire then listed the 11 possible divisions again.  
The binary responses to these 22 variables comprised the belief data, which 
were designed to measure third parties’ respective first- and second-order normative 
beliefs about the fairness of each offer. Asking about first-order normative beliefs 
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does not let us conclude that a social norm is in place, and is perceived as such by 
the participants. We may all think that a 50/50 division is fair, but this does not 
necessarily imply that we also think most others hold the same conviction. For a 
social norm to exist (Bicchieri, 2006, p. 11), there must be collective consensus that 
a specific behavioral rule is socially prescribed (or proscribed) in a given context. In 
this case, second-order normative beliefs (normative expectations) about what is fair 
will be mutually consistent. For example, individuals could believe that ($7,$3) is 
fair (first-order normative belief), but not expect others to believe it (second-order 
normative belief), in which case there would be no mutually shared belief that 
($7,$3) is socially prescribed.1 Without agreement in second-order normative beliefs 
(normative expectations), a behavioral regularity would not be a social norm, and 
consequently there would be no agreement about what behaviors constitute a norm 
violation and therefore might elicit a sanction, as well as a compensation for the 
victim.  
2.3. Design 
This led to a 2 x 3 x 2 between-participants design of adjustment condition (deduct-
only or punish/compensate/reward), offer (($5,$5), ($7,$3), or ($8,$2)), and fairness 
context (equity or equality). The dependent variable was the pair of adjustments in 
USD that the third party made to the Proposer’s and Responder’s payoffs. We 
predicted that the amounts paid to punish the Proposer and compensate the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1A typical case in which first and second-order normative beliefs diverge is that of pluralistic 
ignorance, where a majority of group members privately reject a norm, but assume incorrectly that 
most others accept it and thus keep obeying it (Katz & Allport, 1931) 
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Responder would decrease with increases in the amount that the Proposer offered to 
the Responder, as third parties would find fewer reasons to adjust payoffs for 
divisions which were closer to equality. However, we expected the effect of offer 
would be moderated by fairness context, as uneven offers would be interpreted as 
being fairer under an equity context. As a separate hypothesis, we predicted that 
participants would trade off punishment and compensation in the all-adjustments 
condition, so that the amounts they deducted from the Proposer’s payoff would be 
lower than in the deduct-only condition. Whenever presented with even offers of 
($5,$5) in the all-adjustments condition, we also expected third parties to offer some 
reward to Proposers for obeying a fairness norm, the reward being possibly greater 
in a condition of equity, where some deviation from a 50/50 share is justifiable. 
Because we expected little to no variation in the behavior of third parties for the 
($5,$5), deduct-only condition, for which we expected no “punishment” (i.e., zero 
adjustments, as there was no norm violation), we intentionally created an unbalanced 
design, assigning only 9 participants to this condition and the remainder roughly 
evenly to the remaining conditions (see Table 1). As expected, none of the 9 
participants in the ($5,$5), deduct-only condition made any adjustments.  
MANOVA F-tests used Pillai-Bartlett’s statistic. All analyses of variance 
respected the principle of marginality and used Type-II sums of squares. 
Table 1 
Sample Size by Adjustment Condition, Offer, and Fairness Context 
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  Adjustment condition 
 All-adjustments  Deduct-only 
Offer: ($5,$5) ($7,$3) ($8,$2)  ($5,$5) ($7,$3) ($8,$2) 
Fairness context        
Equity 18 17 19  4 20 19 
Equality 18 17 21  5 19 19 
Total 36 34 40  9 39 38 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Overview 
Figure 1 shows bivariate mean payoff adjustments by fairness context, offer, and 
adjustment condition. As expected, there was a clear main effect of adjustment 
condition, as third parties on average made positive adjustments to payoffs in the 
punish/compensate condition, and enacted negative sanctions against Proposers in 
the deduct-only condition. In addition, the amount that the Proposer offered had a 
strong effect in the expected directions on the adjustments third parties made to the 
Proposer’s and Responder’s payoffs. There appeared to be no effect of fairness 
context, as evidenced by the visual similarity of the left and right panels of Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Ellipses show direction of covariation but are omitted for adjustments of 
$0.00. 
 
3.2. Adjustment behavior 
A 3 x 2 x 2 MANOVA of adjustments made to the Proposer’s and Responder’s 
payoffs confirmed the presence of main effects of offer (F(4, 370) = 11.0, p < .0001) 
and adjustment condition (F(2, 184) = 46.1, p < .0001)). There were no significant 
effects of fairness context (F(2, 184) = 0.4, p = .67), Offer x Fairness Context (F(4, 
370) = 1.7, p = .15), Offer x Adjustment Condition (F(4, 370) = 0.67, p = .61), 
Fairness Context x Adjustment Condition (F(2, 184) = 0.1, p =.94), or the three-way 
interaction (F(4, 370) = 1.0, p = 0.44). Although the MANOVA detected no effect of 
fairness context, because we had a specific, directional hypothesis that adjustments 
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to the Proposer would be higher and adjustments to the Responder would be lower in 
the equity context, we reanalyzed the data using more powerful statistical methods. 
However, an exact, multivariate permutation test revealed no significant effects of 
fairness context (p = .52), fairness context by offer (p = .25), fairness context by 
adjustment condition (p = .82), or fairness context by offer by adjustment condition 
(p = . 28).2 Therefore, we collapsed over fairness context in subsequent analyses. 
The effect of adjustment condition was driven by more negative adjustments 
in the deduct-only condition than in the all-adjustments condition, for both the 
Proposer’s payoff (M = +$0.85 for deduct-only and M = -$1.79 for all-adjustments) 
and Responder’s payoff M = +$2.96 for deduct-only and M = -$0.14 for all-
adjustments). The effect of offer amount was driven by higher adjustments for 
($5,$5) offers for both the Proposer’s payoff (M = $2.33 for ($5,$5), M = -$0.95 for 
($7,$3), and M = $1.26 for ($8,$2)) and the Responder’s payoff (M = $2.87 for 
($5,$5), M = $1.08 for ($7,$3), and M = $1.35 for ($8,$2)).  
That adjustments to the Proposer’s payoff were higher when the Proposer 
offered ($5,$5) was consistent with our prediction that third parties would reward 
fair outcomes. However, we did not expect adjustments to the Responder’s payoff to 
also be positive for ($5,$5) offers, as Responders did nothing to generate the even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The permutation test of Strasser & Weber (1999) implemented in the R coin package and described 
by Hothorn, Hornik, van de Wiel, & Zeileis (2006) maps a multivariate linear statistic, T, into a 
univariate test statistic by standardizing T and taking the maximum of absolute values over T. For the 
present application, T is the sum of bivariate adjustments in the equality and equity conditions, where 
the adjustments to the Responder’s payoff is pre-multiplied by -1. Standardizing this vector and 
taking the higher of the absolute value of adjustments to the Proposer’s and Responder’s payoff yields 
the univariate statistic. Permuting the fairness context labels then yields the null distribution from 
which the proportion of test statistics greater than the observed statistic determines the p-value. This 
method is exact up to arbitrary Monte Carlo precision.  
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outcome. This unexpected finding may be due to third parties not wanting to create 
inequality by rewarding only Proposers. Indeed, creating an inequality in this case 
would defeat the purpose of positively sanctioning norm-abiding behavior, as in this 
case the desired outcome is equality. 
As expected, there was no evidence of spite (negative adjustments to the 
Proposer for even offers, or any negative adjustments to the Responder). 
3.3. Inequality Aversion and Half as a Focal Point 
Did third parties attempt to equalize the payoffs of Proposers and Responders? 
Figure 2 shows mean payoffs before and after third party adjustments. An ANOVA 
of the difference between the Proposer’s and Responder’s adjusted payoffs revealed 
significant effects of offer amount (F(2, 185) = 28.7, p < .0001) and adjustment 
condition (F(1, 185) = 5.5, p = .02), and no other main effects or interactions. The 
Proposer’s adjusted payoff was $3.40 higher than the Responder’s for offers of 
($8,$2), p < .0001, $1.97 higher for offers of ($7,$3) , p < .0001, but not 
significantly different for offers of ($5,$5), p = .14. In the all-adjustments condition, 
the Proposer’s adjusted payoff was $1.28 higher than the Responder’s (p < .0001), 
and $2.81 higher in the deduct-only condition (p < .0001). These remaining payoff 
inequalities should be judged relative to the original inequalities, which were $0.00 
for offers of ($5,$5), $4.00 for ($7,$3), and $6.00 for ($8,$2). On average, third 
parties reduced the amount of inequality between the Proposer’s and Responder’s 
payoffs, but did not equalize them, as indicated by the sizable and statistically 
significant remaining differences.  
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Modal adjusted payoffs were ($5,$5) for both ($5,$5) offers and ($7,$3) 
offers; for ($8,$2) offers, ($5,$5) was the second most frequent outcome. In the all-
adjustment condition, third parties appeared to be motivated to bring the 
Responder’s payoff up to $5, the ‘rightful’ share dictated by a norm of fairness. In 
the deduct-only condition, third parties adjusted the Proposer’s payoffs of $8 or $7 to 
$5, but no lower. Thus, $5 was a focal point for most third parties, and their primary 
motivation was to ensure payoffs were close to this focal point, although the 
difference between the modal and mean adjusted payoffs implied significant 
heterogeneity. Thus, third parties sought to pursue a variety of sanctioning motives 
subject to the constraint that they create no additional inequality, and were not averse 
to allowing inequalities in payoffs to remain. 
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Figure 2. Payoff adjustments by adjustment condition. Black arrows join payoffs 
before and after third party adjustments. Payoff labels were rounded to the nearest 
whole number to facilitate visualization. Gray arrows represent the directions of the 
greatest increases in payoff equality. The 45 degree line corresponds to complete 
equality. 
3.4. Willingness to Spend on Third-Party Sanctioning and Compensation 
In addition to considering the pattern of adjusted payoffs, it is also worthwhile to ask 
whether the cost that third parties incurred to adjust Proposer’s and Responder’s 
payoffs differed by condition. Because third parties had to spend $0.25 for each 
$1.00 they added to or deducted from the Proposer’s or Responder’s payoffs, total 
expenditures could reach $5.00. An ANOVA of the amounts spent by third parties 
revealed significant effects of offer amount (F(2,185) = 3.7, p = .0268), adjustment 
condition (F(1,185) = 21.0, p < .0001), and their two-way interaction (F(2,185) = 
8.7, p = .0063). No other main effects or interactions reached significance.  
For the deduct-only condition, expenditures were $0.00 for offers of ($5,$5), 
$0.43 for offers of ($7,$3), and $0.65 for offers of ($8,$2). For the all-adjustments 
condition, third parties spent $1.66 for offers of ($5,$5), $0.88 for ($7,$3), and $1.08 
for ($8,$2). Of particular note is that the respective expenditures by offer amount in 
the all-adjustments were all significantly higher than in the deduct-only condition.  
 
3.5. Heterogeneity in Third Party Adjustment Behavior 
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The fact that, on average, third parties adjusted payoffs only partially to equality 
could belie significant heterogeneity in motives and behavior. The average 
movement of adjustments in the all-adjustment condition was ($7,$5) and ($8,$5) for 
offers of ($7,$3) and ($8,$2), and ($8,$9) for ($5,$5) offers. Yet ($5,$5) was the 
modal outcome for both ($5,$5) offers and ($7,$3) offers, and it was the second most 
frequent outcome for ($8,$2) offers. This shows that the adjusted payoff of ($5,$5) 
was a focal point for most, but not all, players. 
To explore potential heterogeneity in adjustment behavior, we categorized 
each outcome into one of the nine combinations formed by whether the Proposer’s 
and the Responder’s payoffs respectively were increased, decreased, or left 
unchanged; Table 2 tabulates these categories by offer amount and adjustment 
condition. There was a substantial number of failures to make any payoff adjustment 
(see (n,n) category), comprising 12-30% of the data in the all-adjustments condition, 
and 34-100% of the data in the deduct-only condition. Because adjustments had a 
monetary cost to participants, it is likely that such behavior reflects greater weighting 
of selfish motives compared to the desire to punish, reward, or compensate. 
Moreover, for some participants this selfish concern appears to be stronger when 
outcomes are very unequal, as it costs more to restore equality. Despite the 
observation that, on average, third parties spent more when faced with ($8,$2), in the 
all-adjustment condition, 30% chose to do nothing (n,n), as opposed to only 12% of 
third parties who were presented with the ($7,$3) outcome. And whereas 35% of 
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third partied presented with ($7,$3) compensated the Responder (n,+), only 15% of 
those presented with ($8,$2) did so.  
Although the majority of the remaining adjustments reduced the amount of 
inequality, there was clearly a separate motive to increase total payoffs. 61% of 
participants increased both the Proposer’s and Responder’s payoffs for ($5,$5) 
offers, 18% did so for ($7,$3) offers, and 25% did so for ($8,$2) offers. On the 
whole, it appears that third parties sought to pursue a variety of sanctioning motives 
subject to the constraint that they create no additional inequality.  
Table 2 
Counts of Adjusted Payoff by Adjusted Payoff Category, Adjustment Condition, and 
Offer 
    Adjusted Payoff Category1 
  Offer (+,+) (n,+) (-,+) (+,n) (+,-) (n,n) (-,n) (n,-) (-,-) 
All-
Adj. 
($5,$5) 22 4 2 1 0 7 0 0 0 
($7,$3) 6 12 12 0 0 4 0 0 0 
($8,$2) 10 6 12 0 0 12 0 0 0 
Deduct-
Only 
($5,$5) 
     
9 0 0 0 
($7,$3) 
     
18 19 1 1 
($8,$2) 
     
13 24 0 1 
1“+” represents a positive adjustment to the offer, “-” a negative adjustment, and “n” 
no adjustment. In each pair, the first position represents an adjustment to the payoff 
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of the Proposer, and the second position represents an adjustment to the payoff of the 
Responder. For example, for an offer of ($7,$3), an adjusted payoff of ($5,$5) would 
be classified as “(-,+)” and an adjusted payoff of ($7,$7) would be classified as 
“(n,+)”. 
 
3.6. Third-Party Normative Fairness beliefs 
Table 3 shows average third party first and second-order normative beliefs about fair 
offers by fairness context and offer. 47 participants were excluded due to missing 
data. Normative beliefs were unimodal, with almost all participants indicating that 
($5,$5) was fair and that they believed the majority of other third parties believed it 
was fair. At the extremes, only 5% of participants considered ($10,$0) to be fair, 
whereas 15% considered ($0,$10) to be fair.  
There were significant differences in beliefs by fairness context. Consistent 
with our hypotheses, participants in the equity context were more likely than 
participants in the equality context to view splits favoring the Proposer as being “fair 
for both the Proposer and the Responder,” averaging across offers. On the other 
hand, participants in the equality context were more likely to view splits favoring the 
Responder as being “fair for both the Proposer and the Responder.” Second-order 
normative beliefs (whether the participant believed the majority of other participants 
believed each option was fair) exhibited a similar pattern, characterized by 
participants in the equity context being more likely to believe that others though 
splits favoring the Proposer were fair. Similarly, in the equality condition, splits 
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favoring the Responders were believed to be judged as fair by the majority of 
participants. It is interesting to note that, though the “entitlements” of Stage 1 were 
simply due to earning high scores on a general knowledge quiz, and thus had little 
substantial justification, they strongly influenced third parties’ first and second-order 
beliefs about fair divisions.  
 Because Table 3 reveals only average fairness beliefs, it potentially masks a 
variety of important individual-level patterns. Consider, for example, that 5% of 
participants believed ($10,$0) was “fair for both the Proposer and the Responder” 
(hereafter “fair for both players”) and that 15% believed ($0,$10) was fair for both 
players. It would seem highly unlikely that these two groups overlapped at all. More 
generally, we expected that participants who held Proposer-favoring normative 
beliefs (i.e., ($10,$0), ($9,$1), ($8,$2), etc. are fair for both players) would be largely 
distinct from participants who held Responder-favoring beliefs (i.e., ($0,$10), 
($1,$9), ($2,$8), etc. are fair for both players). In addition, we expected such 
individual-level patterns to vary by fairness context, with participants in the equity 
context being more likely to adopt Proposer-favoring normative beliefs, and 
participants in the equality context being more like to adopt Responder-favoring 
beliefs. 
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To investigate participant-level heterogeneity in beliefs, we subjected the 11 first-
order fairness beliefs to a latent class analysis. A four-class solution shown in Table 
4 was chosen based on successive goodness of fit tests and interpretability. Class 1 
had an estimated population share of 42%, and was characterized by participants 
who believed that roughly even splits – namely ($6,$4), ($5,$5), and ($4,$6) – were 
fair. Class 2 accounted for an estimated 34% of the population, and was 
Table 3 
Summary of Fairness Beliefs by Fairness Context 
  Fairness Context 
 Offer Equity Equality All 
Is the offer fair for the both Proposer and the Responder?   
($10,$0) 5% 4% 5% 
($9,$1) 11% 4% 7% 
($8,$2) 23% 5% 14% 
($7,$3) 37% 18% 28% 
($6,$4) 72% 52% 62% 
($5,$5) 93% 100% 97% 
($4,$6) 41% 61% 51% 
($3,$7) 17% 27% 22% 
($2,$8) 9% 23% 16% 
($1,$9) 9% 22% 16% 
($0,$10) 8% 21% 15% 
Do the majority of other participants believe the offer is fair?   
($10,$0) 1% 0% 1% 
($9,$1) 7% 0% 3% 
($8,$2) 17% 3% 10% 
($7,$3) 49% 18% 34% 
($6,$4) 80% 65% 73% 
($5,$5) 95% 100% 97% 
($4,$6) 48% 61% 55% 
($3,$7) 21% 23% 22% 
($2,$8) 7% 12% 9% 
($1,$9) 4% 9% 7% 
($0,$10) 4% 8% 6% 
N 74 75 149 
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characterized by the belief that only ($5,$5) was fair. Class 3 had an estimated 
population share of 16%, and was characterized primarily by the belief that 
Responder-favoring splits –namely ($0,$10), ($1,$9), ($2,$8), ($3,$7), ($4,$6) – 
were fair. Finally, Class 4 accounted for 9% of population and was characterized by 
the belief that Proposer-favoring splits – namely ($9,$1), ($8,$2), ($7,$3), ($6,$4) – 
were fair. 
Table 4 
Estimated Latent Class Parameters by Fairness Beliefs (N = 149)  
 
Latent Class1 
Offer 1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
($10,$0) 
    
0.2 
 
0.2 
($9,$1) 
    
0.3 
 
0.4 
($8,$2) 
    
0.3 
 
1.0 
($7,$3) 
    
0.4 
 
1.0 
($6,$4) 0.9 
 
0.2 
 
0.7 
 
0.8 
($5,$5) 1.0 
 
1.0 
 
1.0 
 
0.8 
($4,$6) 0.8 
   
1.0 
 
0.2 
($3,$7) 0.1 
   
1.0 
 
0.1 
($2,$8) 
    
1.0 
  
($1,$9) 
    
1.0 
  
($0,$10) 
    
0.9 
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Est. Population Share 41.4% 
 
33.7% 
 
16.1% 
 
8.7% 
Note: Estimates less than 0.1 are not shown. 
1Class descriptions: 1) Roughly even-split; 2) Even-split; 3) Responder-favoring; 4) 
Proposer-favoring. 
Table 5 tabulates predicted class membership – that is, the latent class to which each 
of the 149 participants was most likely to be assigned based on posterior modes – by 
fairness context. As expected, class membership varied by fairness context (p = 
.0002, Fisher’s exact test for independence), with the effect being driven by the 
complete absence of Class 4 (those who believed Proposer-favoring splits were fair) 
in the equality condition, and a smaller proportion of Class 3 (those who believed 
Responder-favoring splits were fair) in the equity condition. Fairness context thus 
had a strong association with whether participants adopted fairness beliefs that 
favored the Proposer or the Responder. Although we do not report them here, nearly 
identical analyses and conclusions for the latent class analysis and the association 
between predicted class membership and equity context obtained for second-order 
beliefs. 
 Finally, a 4 x 2 MANOVA of adjustments made to the Proposer’s and 
Responder’s payoffs revealed no effects of predicted class membership (F(6, 284) = 
0.97, p = .45), fairness context (F(2, 141) = 0.18, p = .84)), or their two-way 
interaction (F(4, 284) = 0.09, p = .99)). 
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Table 5 
Cross-Tabulation of Predicted Class Membership by Fairness Context 
 
Latent Class 
 
 Fairness Context 1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
Total 
Equity 25 
 
29 
 
7 
 
13 
 
74 
Equality 31 
 
27 
 
17 
 
0 
 
75 
Total 56 
 
56 
 
24 
 
13 
 
149 
 
4. Discussion 
Third party norm-regulating behavior appeared to be driven by at least two distinct 
motives: 1) to reward equal outcomes without creating inequality and 2) to adjust 
parties’ unequal payoffs to a normative value. When adding to the payoffs of the 
Proposer or the Responder was an option, third parties increased the payoffs of both 
parties in equal amounts when the Proposer offered ($5,$5). For uneven offers of 
($7,$3) or ($8,$2), however, third parties reduced inequality either by compensating 
the Responder when compensation was an available option or – when the only 
option for adjustment was to deduct – by punishing the Proposer. Of note is that 
adjustments in both conditions give one of the players the “rightful” payoff of $5, in 
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line with a fairness norm. Finally, this pattern of behavior is not compatible with a 
theory of inequality aversion, as third parties allowed payoff inequalities to remain 
and also exhibited rewarding behavior.  
First and second-order normative beliefs show that a majority of third parties 
endorsed (and agreed upon) fairness norms and were sensitive to contextual 
differences. Fairness as equality (the $5,$5 outcome) was endorsed by the largest 
majorities of participants in both conditions. In the equity condition, a majority of 
72% also believed that ($6,$4) was fair, as opposed to a small majority of 52% in the 
equality condition. This pattern was reversed for the ($4,$6) outcome; in the equality 
condition, 61% considered this outcome to be fair, whereas only 41% of third parties 
thought so in the equity condition. The second-order normative beliefs show the 
same pattern, suggesting that there is an implicit agreement as to what fairness 
dictates in each condition.  
Note that third parties in the equity condition were judging the fairness of 
different possible offers under the Stage 1 description provided by the 
experimenters. It was thus clear to them that the “entitlement” was related to scoring 
higher on an arbitrary quiz. Though one may doubt that performance on an arbitrary 
quiz would justify entitlement, third parties believed otherwise. For example, 49% of 
third parties held the belief that a majority of other parties would find a ($7,$3) 
division to be fair in the equity condition, whereas only 18% of third parties held 
such belief in the equality condition.  
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However, the manner in which roles were assigned to Proposers and 
Responders did not affect adjustment behavior. Because our analyses showed strong 
effects of fairness context on first and second-order fairness beliefs, we consider our 
manipulation of the relevant fairness norm -- equality, in the case of random role 
assignment, and equity, in the case of performance-based role assignment -- to have 
been successful. Against the background of previous findings that equity contexts 
lowered offers (Hoffman et al., 1994), one interpretation of our findings is that the 
equality norm overshadowed the effects of fairness context. Thus, though third 
parties recognize the difference between equity and equality, their behavior is much 
less fine-tuned, showing that an egalitarian principle is far more important than 
equity in deciding how to adjust players’ payoffs.  
Another possibility is that normative consensus is not a good predictor of 
behavior, and that actual behavior better measures the intensity with which 
normative principles are adhered to. Whereas our questionnaire measures the level of 
normative consensus, actual behavior measures the intensity with which these 
principles are adhered to (Rauhut & Winter, 2010). Thus a norm may be present but, 
as Ostrom (2000) observed, “social norms may lead individuals to behave differently 
in the same objective situation depending on how strongly they value conformance 
with (or deviance from) a norm” (p. 144). In our experiment, the public declaration 
of adjustment should have made second-order normative expectations of fairness as 
equality particularly salient (and safe to publicly endorse). If third parties want to 
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conform to the expected majority opinion, they would discount context differences 
in favor of the focal ($5,$5) allocation.  
 In addition, third parties were more willing to incur personal costs to modify 
the payoffs of others when they had the opportunity to sanction or compensate, as 
opposed to having only the option to negatively sanction. This finding is relevant to 
theories of justice and tort law in which the compensation of a victim may be traded 
off against the punishment of a perpetrator, and suggests that on the whole, third 
parties are averse to punishing and prefer instead to compensate.  
Although third party punishment has been extensively studied in laboratory 
settings, our paper contributes to the literature by comparing a broader set of 
regulatory mechanisms that can serve to uphold a norm, namely negative sanctions, 
positive sanctions, and compensation behavior by third parties. Future work could 
compare brain activation patterns implicated in negative sanctioning (e.g., 
Buckholtz, et al., 2008; de Quervain, et al., 2004) to those in positive sanctioning or 
compensation to test whether different mechanisms of regulating social norms 
activate the same neural pathways. As interest grows in studying the regulation of 
norms other than fairness – such as trust, reciprocity, and corruption – it will be 
increasingly important to consider both positive sanctioning and compensation 
behavior in addition to negative sanctioning to better understand how norms operate 
in the real world.  
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